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ESTATE OF FORTIER V. CITY OF LEWISTON: IS 
MAINE’S TORT CLAIMS ACT UNINTELLIGIBLE? 
William Olver* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 
sitting as the Law Court, was asked to decide if the City of Lewiston was “using” 
an aircraft under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) when it chartered a plane 
from Twin Cities Air Services (Twin Cities) as part of an Air Force Junior Reserve 
Officer Training Corp (AFJROTC) exercise.2  Tragically, the pilot and three 
AFJROTC cadets from Lewiston High School lost their lives when the plane 
crashed into Barker Mountain shortly after take-off.3  The families of the students 
brought suit against Lewiston, in part, alleging negligence on behalf of the high 
school’s Senior Aerospace Instructor, who was responsible for coordinating the 
chartered flight as part of the AFJROTC program.4 
A slim majority held that, under the court’s rules of statutory construction, and 
in the interest of narrowly construing exceptions to immunity under the MTCA, the 
statutory exception for “use”5 only applied when the governmental entity had some 
measure of direct control over the vehicle that was being used.6  Because the 
aircraft was under the direct control of Twin Cities’ pilot, Lewiston was not 
“using” the plane as defined by the MTCA and was thus immune from suit.7  The 
dissent would not have equated “use” to “operation,” as it believed the majority 
did, but instead would have used a broader, plain meaning definition of “use.”8  
When Lewiston chartered the plane as part of its AFJROTC program, this “use” 
qualified as an exception to the MTCA, allowing the lawsuit to go forward.9 
This Note begins by discussing the historical background of state sovereign 
immunity generally within the United States and specifically within Maine.  Part III 
will discuss the facts of Fortier as well as the majority’s and dissent’s analyses.  
Part IV will address several other avenues the Law Court could have used to decide 
the case without further interpreting the MTCA.  Part V will examine other states’ 
tort claims acts (generally, TCAs) to see how Fortier may have been decided had 
they been applied.  Part VI will briefly explore a recent case analyzing the MTCA.  
Part VII will conclude that the overly ambiguous language of the MTCA prevents 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank 
Professor Jennifer Wriggins and the members of the Maine Law Review for their review of this Note. 
 1. 2010 ME 50, 997 A.2d 84 (4-3 decision). 
 2. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 997 A.2d at 85-86. 
 3. Id. ¶ 4, 997 A.2d at 86. 
 4. Id. ¶ 5, 997 A.2d at 86. 
 5. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §8104-A(1)(2003 & Supp. 2010) (“A governmental entity is 
liable for its negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance or use of any . . . [a]ircraft.”). 
 6. Fortier, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 15, 997 A.2d at 89. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. ¶¶ 21-22, 997 A.2d at 90-91 (Silver, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court, as 
well as legal and non-legal dictionaries, define “use” as some sort of “employment”). 
 9. Id. ¶ 26, 997 A.2d at 92. 
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the court from faithfully interpreting the Maine Legislature’s intent and will urge 
the Legislature to amend the MTCA in the interest of clarity. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
A.  Federal 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States has its roots in 
English common law and was thought to pass through to the several states before 
the founding of this country.10  When the Constitution was drafted in 1787, Article 
III cast doubt on this principle by exposing states to suits from citizens of other 
states and foreign states.11  In 1793, the United States Supreme Court dealt 
precisely with this issue in Chisholm v. Georgia and abolished the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity with respect to states.12  Several years later, in response to 
Chisholm, Congress proposed, and three-fourths of the states ratified, the Eleventh 
Amendment, which reinstated states’ sovereign immunity, at least to the extent that 
Article III encroached upon it.13   
Still open was the question whether a state was amenable to suit from one of 
its own citizens.14  For more than 100 years, states enjoyed protection from 
lawsuits, and the Supreme Court even answered the earlier question by extending 
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit suits against a state by one of 
its citizens.15  However, the doctrine showed cracks in 1908 when the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 10. The doctrine’s history can be described as follows: 
[T]he doctrine is derived from the laws and practices of our English ancestors; and . . . is 
beyond question that from the time of Edward the First until now the King of England 
was not suable in the courts of that country. . . . And while the exemption of the United 
States and of the several States from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in 
the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been 
discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established 
doctrine. 
See generally JOHN LOBATO & JEFFERY THEODORE, STUDENT AUTHORS, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 21, FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/FedSovereign_21.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-07 (1882)). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a 
State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects”). 
 12. 2 U.S. 419, 469 (1793) (indicating that “the Constitution warrants a suit against a State, by an 
individual citizen of another State”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend XI (1795) (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”). 
 14. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1988). 
 15. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) (“The state courts have no power to entertain suits 
of individuals against a state without its consent.  Then how does the circuit court, having only 
concurrent jurisdiction, acquire any such power?”).  The Hans court described Chisholm as a decision 
that sent “a shock of surprise throughout the country”; the Eleventh Amendment, as well as the decision 
in Hans, was simply a return to what was known before the Constitution.  See John. J. Gibbons, The 
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 
1893-94 (1983) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 11). 
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Court ruled that sovereign immunity was not absolute and states did not have 
immunity against lawsuits alleging an unconstitutional action by the state.16  
Furthermore, the Court determined that Congress may limit state sovereign 
immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment.17  In 1946, the Federal Government 
passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waived sovereign immunity for itself 
with respect to torts.18  Afterwards, states began to follow with their own tort 
claims acts.19 
B.  Maine 
Maine’s sovereign immunity also has its roots in English law.  In 1788, Russell 
v. Men of Devon was decided in England and supported the doctrine of immunity 
under the principle that “the king can do no wrong.”20  In 1812, Massachusetts took 
the lead from Russell and extended the concept to municipalities, despite the lack 
of a king or comparable entity.21  Later, Maine built upon the Massachusetts 
standard but also gradually began to carve out exceptions to the rigid doctrine.22  
Notably, although a municipality was not liable for discretionary acts, it was liable 
for ministerial acts.23  As early as 1961, however, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity came under attack in Maine as being contrary to public policy.24  In the 
early 1970s, several cases came before the Law Court, which again questioned the 
viability of the doctrine and strongly urged the Legislature to take action to remedy 
the situation but fell short of crafting a judicial solution.25  Although the Legislature 
did consider limiting the scope of sovereign immunity after these cases, ultimately 
it did nothing.26  After several years of inaction by the Legislature, the Law Court 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 11 (discussing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).  In Young, 
the Court held that “[t]he state cannot . . . impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the 
supreme authority of the United States.”  209 U.S. at 167. 
 17. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 12 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). 
 18. See John Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait: Negative Statutes of Limitation in the Government Tort 
Liability Setting, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 259, 270 (2005).  See also Federal Torts Claims 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 19. See generally Martinez, supra note 18, at 273-76 (indicating that Florida was one of the first 
states to judicially abolish sovereign immunity in 1957, to which the Florida Legislature responded by 
passing a TCA in 1973). 
 20. R. Michael Martin, Common Law Sovereign Immunity and the Maine Tort Claims Act: A Rose 
by Another Name, 35 ME. L. REV. 256, 266-67 (1983) (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. 
Rep. 359 (K.B.)). 
 21. Id. at 267 (referencing Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812)). 
 22. See id. at 268-69. 
 23. Id. at 268.  The concept of a discretionary act versus a ministerial act is discussed briefly in Part 
IV.A. 
 24. See id. at 276.  In response to an accident caused by negligent maintenance on the Maine 
Turnpike, the court suggested that “sovereign immunity from tort liability has served its usefulness and 
ought to be destroyed.”  Id. (quoting Nelson v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 157 Me. 174, 186, 170 A.2d 687, 693 
(1961)). 
 25. See generally Bartashevich v. City of Portland, 308 A.2d 551, 551 (Me. 1973) (reiterating the 
court’s disapproval of the doctrine); Bale v. Ryder, 286 A.2d 344, 344, 347-48 (Me. 1972) (a police 
officer accused of assault, battery, and false arrest was ultimately dismissed despite the court’s 
reservations on the doctrine’s fairness). 
 26. See Martin, supra note 20, at 277. 
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finally had enough, and, in 1976, abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 
Davies v. City of Bath.27  The Legislature quickly responded by passing the MTCA, 
which generally restored sovereign immunity save for a few exceptions that would 
allow a lawsuit to go forward.28 
III.  THE FORTIER DECISION 
A.  Background 
In June 2006, as part of Lewiston High School’s AFJROTC program, the 
school’s Senior Aerospace Instructor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Robert Meyer 
contracted with Twin Cities to provide training flights to a number of cadets.29  
Charlie Weir, a FAA-certified instructor, was Twin Cities’ pilot for the day.30  
Previously, Meyer had used Twin Cities and Weir to provide similar flights without 
incident.31  On this occasion, students split up into several groups.32  When the first 
group returned, Meyer noted that Weir’s landing was “unusual” but was not 
concerned enough to halt the flights.33  After a quick turnaround, the second group 
of three students took off with Weir; the plane quickly flew over Barker Mountain 
and out of sight.34  Matthew Taylor, a student aboard the first flight, reported to 
Meyer several irregularities with Weir’s flying, including Weir not wearing any 
shoes, performing a “zero-gee”35 maneuver, and flying close to the tree-tops.36  It is 
unclear if the communication between Taylor and Weir occurred before or after the 
second flight took off.37  Later, it was discovered that the plane had crashed into 
                                                                                                     
 27. 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976).  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the city’s negligent 
maintenance of its sewer system damaged her property.  Id. at 1269.  The court held that “[w]e will no 
longer dismiss actions in tort brought against the State or its political divisions solely on the basis of 
governmental immunity.”  Id. at 1273. 
 28. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101-18 (2003 & Supp. 2010).  There are several relevant 
MTCA sections for this Note.  Section 8103 generally provides immunity from suit to governmental 
entities.  Section 8104-A allows four primary exceptions to immunity: negligent ownership, 
maintenance, or use of vehicles and other similar equipment; negligent construction, operation, or 
maintenance of a public building or an appurtenance to a public building; negligent discharge of 
pollutants; and negligent road construction or repair.  In particular, Section 8104-A(1)(D) states: “A 
governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance or use of 
any . . . [a]ircraft.”  Sections 8104-B(3) and 8111(1)(C), which are exceptions granting immunity 
notwithstanding waiver for discretionary functions, and Section 8116, which relates to liability 
insurance, will be discussed briefly in Part IV. 
 29. Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, ANDSC-CV-2008-084 at 3 (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., 
July 22, 2009) (Delahanty, J.). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Brief of Appellees Estate of Fortier et al. at 7, Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 
50, 997 A.2d 84 (No. AND-09-422) [hereinafter Brief of Appellees]. 
 34. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., REPORT NO. NYC06FA154 (2007) [hereinafter NTSB REPORT]. 
 35. That is, the occupants of the plane experienced a brief moment of weightlessness. 
 36. Brief of Appellees, supra note 33, at 9. 
 37. Fortier’s brief alleges that the communication took place immediately after the first group exited 
the plane and before the second group took off.  Id.  Lewiston’s brief alleges that Meyer was not made 
aware of any piloting irregularities until after the crash.  Brief of Appellants City of Lewiston et al. at 8, 
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Barker Mountain; there were no survivors.38 
The families of the students aboard the ill-fated flight brought suit against 
Lewiston, claiming that Meyer’s failure to stop the second group from boarding the 
plane—given his alleged knowledge of the first flight—was negligent.39  
Additionally, even though Lewiston was a qualifying governmental entity under 
the MTCA, the suit argued that the exception to immunity for “use” of an aircraft 
should apply in this case.40  Specifically, the families argued that Lewiston was 
“liable for its ‘negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance or use of 
any aircraft.’”41 
Lewiston contended that it was immune from suit because it was not “using” 
the plane under the definition of the MTCA.42  Alternatively, Lewiston argued that 
Meyer was performing a discretionary function while supervising the AFJROTC 
program, providing immunity for Lewiston, notwithstanding the “use” exception.43  
On Lewiston’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled for the families, 
noting that Lewiston was “using” the aircraft for the chartered flights under the 
MTCA and that Meyer’s decision to allow the second group of student to take off 
was not a discretionary function.44  Lewiston appealed.45 
B.  Majority and Dissent 
The majority began by reviewing the principles of statutory construction in 
MTCA cases: “Immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly 
construed.”46  With that in mind, they determined that the case turned on whether 
or not Lewiston was “using” the aircraft.47  In order to parse the language of 
Section 8104-A of the MTCA, the majority looked to the surrounding language to 
provide a context for “use.”48  Notably, the statute references a governmental entity 
by discussing “its negligent acts in its [ownership and] maintenance.”49  For these 
two categories, “its” implies a measure of control by the governmental entity.50  
Because these provisions are very specific, the majority found that a broad meaning 
of “use” would be illogical and interpreted a restrictive meaning for “use” as part of 
                                                                                                     
Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, 997 A.2d 84 (No. AND-09-422) [hereinafter Brief of 
Appellants]. 
 38. Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, ANDSC-CV-2008-084 at 3 (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., 
July 22, 2009) (Delahanty, J.). 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. Id. (citation omitted). 
 42. Fortier, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 6, 997 A.2d at 86. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  Interlocutory appeals are generally not allowable, but raising a claim of immunity is an 
exception to the rule.  Id. ¶ 1, 997 A.2d at 85. 
 46. Id. ¶ 8, 997 A.2d at 87 (quoting Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 
78, ¶ 5, 796 A.2d 674, 676). 
 47. Id. ¶ 10, 997 A.2d at 87. 
 48. Id. ¶ 11, 997 A.2d at 87. 
 49. Id. ¶ 12, 997 A.2d at 88 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104-A(1) (2003 & Supp. 2010)) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. 
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the statute’s legislative intent.51  The example put forth was if the governmental 
entity were able to exercise direct control over the aircraft or pilot, such as a state 
trooper flying a Maine State Police aircraft, it would be “using” the aircraft.52  
Because Twin Cities had direct control over the aircraft and its pilot, Lewiston’s 
control through Meyer and the AFJROTC was indirect at best and insufficient to 
trigger an exception to immunity under the MTCA.53  As Lewiston had immunity, 
the court did not discuss whether Meyer’s supervision of the flight was a 
discretionary function.54 
The dissent argued that the restrictive meaning of “use” put forth by the 
majority was equivalent to “operation,” and this narrow meaning contradicted the 
plain meaning of “use.”55  Because “use” has a broader definition than “operate,”56 
it should be read as such; if the Legislature had meant to use the more restrictive 
“operate,” it would have done so when drafting the statute.57  The dissent also 
pointed out that a broad meaning of use does not necessarily expand the breadth of 
the statute without a check: the governmental entity’s use must still be negligent.58  
In this case, because Lewiston’s “use” of the aircraft was contemplated under the 
plain meaning of the statute, the dissent believed that an exception to immunity 
existed and argued that the case should be remanded to determine whether Meyer 
was negligent.59 
C.  Critique 
When interpreting the work of legislatures, courts must utilize some principles 
of statutory construction in order to lend meaning to the words of the statutes.  In 
Maine, as Justice Silver’s dissent articulated in Fortier, the Law Court assumes that 
all words within the statute have an “independent meaning” as the Legislature 
would not intentionally create surplusage.60  As long as courts can glean a 
reasonable interpretation from the language of the statute, words will not be treated 
as surplusage.61  In order to create a reasonable interpretation, the court first looks 
to the plain meaning of the words;62 however, it also reads them within the overall 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 997 A.2d at 88-89. 
 52. Id. ¶ 15, 997 A.2d at 89. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. ¶ 16, 997 A.2d at 89. 
 55. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 997 A.2d at 89-90 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
 56. Compare WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2523 (3rd. ed. 1986) (defining “use” as “to put 
into action or service”), with id. at 1581 (defining “operate” as “bring about . . . by the exertion of 
positive effort or influence”). 
 57. Fortier, 2010 ME 50, ¶¶ 20-22, 997 A.2d at 90-91.  In particular, the dissent points out an 
instance where the legislature used “operation” with respect to aircraft.  Id. ¶ 22, 997 A.2d at 91 (citing 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 3(24) (2009)). 
 58. Id. ¶ 23, 997 A.2d at 91. 
 59. Id. ¶ 26, 997 A.2d at 92. 
 60. Id. ¶ 20, 997 A.2d at 90 (citing Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 21, 898 
A.2d 408, 413). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 16, 988 A.2d 987, 993). 
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statutory scheme to ensure a “harmonious result.”63 
But what happens when the plain meaning of a word creates a possibly 
discordant result?  Should the court defer to the Legislature and err on the side of 
plain meaning, or should the court perpetuate its own judicial fiction and impose a 
pleasant symmetry on the legislative language?  Luckily, the court has created 
another standard for analyzing the MTCA: all exceptions destroying immunity 
must be interpreted narrowly.64  Although this is reasonable given the Legislature’s 
reluctance to abrogate sovereign immunity, there is nothing to suggest that the 
Legislature did not intend to eliminate immunity for “use” to the fullest extent 
envisioned by the MTCA.65 
The priority of these three statutory construction principles as applied to the 
MTCA—plain meaning, harmonious reading, and narrow exceptions—is unclear.  
The majority in Fortier started off with the goal of construing exceptions narrowly 
and then moved on to reading the statute in a harmonious way.  Because it was able 
to interpret the statute using the first two criteria, the majority did not reach the 
plain meaning of the words in its analysis.  The dissent would have started with the 
plain meaning of the text and then, presumably, ensured a harmonious reading.  It 
is unclear how, if at all, the dissent would have applied the narrow construction 
principle although it did express a general disdain for the practice of automatically 
seeking to limit liability.66  In any event, the primary goal for construing statutes 
should be to ascertain and apply the Legislature’s intent as faithfully as possible.  A 
one-vote majority, the equivalent of a judicial coin flip, does not engender much 
certainty that the legislative goals have been accurately applied. 
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. ¶ 11, 997 A.2d at 87 (majority opinion) (citing McPhee v. Me. State Ret. Sys., 2009 ME 100, 
¶ 23, 980 A.2d 1257, 1265).  For the particular statute of interest in McPhee, the Legislature specifically 
instructed that it should be interpreted according to the “plain meaning of its terms.”  ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 17059(6)(A) (2010).  Interestingly, one of the issues was if utilizing the “plain meaning” 
of terms was consistent with the entire statutory scheme.  McPhee, 2009 ME 100, ¶ 23, 980 A.2d at 
1265.  In general, the court attempts to utilize plain meanings, even without explicit legislative direction. 
 64. Fortier, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8, 997 A.2d at 87 (citing Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & 
Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶ 5, 796 A.2d 674, 676).  See also New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Me. Dep’t of 
Transp., 1999 ME 67, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 673, 675 (citing several cases in which the court has required strict 
construction of the MTCA).  The oldest case for strict construction in New Orleans Tanker is Clockedile 
v. State Department of Tranportation, 437 A.2d 187 (Me. 1981).  The authority that Clockedile cites is 
Cushing v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 919, 923 (Me. 1980) (referencing Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543 (Me. 
1978)).  Cushing only requires a “specific authority conferred by an enactment of the legislature” to 
waive sovereign immunity.  Id.  There is no mention that the “specific authority” must be narrowly 
construed. 
 65. The legislative record suggests that the exceptions to immunity were suggested, in part, based 
on accessibility to insurance coverage at a reasonable cost and were intended to provide some relief to 
injured parties.  See 1 Legis. Rec. 71 (1977) and 2 Legis. Rec. 1644 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Collins).  It 
is unclear what caused the court to have a change of heart between Davies in 1976 when it completely 
abrogated sovereign immunity and Clockedile in 1981 when it began to construe the MTCA strictly, 
effectively increasing the scope of sovereign immunity. 
 66. Fortier, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 24, 997 A.2d at 91. 
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IV.  AVOIDING “USE” ALTOGETHER 
A.  Discretionary Function 
Given the court’s discordant views on the meaning of “use” within the MTCA, 
perhaps the court could have held for Lewiston on different grounds and avoided 
interpreting the MTCA altogether.  Title 14, Section 8104-B(3) of the Maine 
Revised Statutes provides immunity for governmental entities, notwithstanding the 
Section 8104-A exceptions, for any discretionary functions or duties.67  The court’s 
reluctance to address the discretionary function provision may be, in part, due to 
the court’s own complicated jurisprudence on the matter. 
In 1981, the court adopted a four-factor test for discretionary immunity, which 
generally looks at the character of the decision and the nature of the governmental 
goal.68  Since that time, the court has applied these factors in a number of cases.69  
For instance, in Norton v. Hall, the Law Court determined that an officer who was 
involved in a car crash while responding to an emergency was entitled to 
discretionary function immunity, reasoning that “the response to an emergency by a 
law enforcement officer serves the basic governmental objective of public 
safety.”70  However, routine patrolling, an everyday operation, was not entitled to 
discretionary immunity.71  Additionally, “[for] conduct [that] has little or no . . . 
governmental conduct but instead resembles decisions or activities carried on by 
                                                                                                     
 67. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 8104-B(3) (2003 & Supp. 2010).  Governmental employees have 
a similar personal immunity when performing discretionary functions within the scope of their 
employment.  Id. § 8111.  If Section 8111 is inapplicable, then the personal immunity for a 
governmental employee’s negligent acts is $10,000.  Id. § 8104-D.  It does not appear that the families 
sued Meyer personally in this case. 
 68. The court gave the following formulation of the test:  
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of 
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 
Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 426 (Me. 1987) (citations omitted). 
 69. See Grossman v. Richards, 1999 ME 9, ¶ 8, 722 A.2d 371, 374 (holding that statements 
regarding public money were a discretionary function and entitled to immunity); Robert v. State, 1999 
ME 89, ¶ 10, 731 A.2d 855, 857-58 (holding that a prison guard shutting a prison door on an inmate’s 
hand was a discretionary function and entitled to immunity); Berard v. McKinnis, 1997 ME 186, ¶ 10, 
699 A.2d 1148, 1151 (holding that the revocation of an EMT’s license was a discretionary function and 
entitled to immunity). 
 70. 2003 ME 118, ¶ 7, 834 A.2d 928, 931.  However, Norton led to a legislative amendment in 2005 
of Section 8104-B(3), which provided that “if the discretionary function involves the operation of a 
motor vehicle . . . this section does not provide immunity for . . . negligent operation . . . regardless of 
whether the employee has immunity under this chapter.”  P.L. 2005, ch. 448, § 1 (codified at § 8104-
B(3)). 
 71. Norton, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 14, 834 A.2d at 932. 
560 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:2 
people generally, discretionary function immunity is not afforded.”72  These types 
of decisions are referred to as “ministerial” or “operational” decisions.  In other 
words, immunity is not automatically afforded simply because there is an element 
of decision-making. 
The scope of discretionary function immunity is itself based on the scope in 
which a particular act is viewed.  For instance, just as a police officer responding to 
an emergency serves the larger goal of public safety, so too does routine patrolling.  
Although responding to an emergency deals with an immediate crisis, everyday 
patrolling helps to prevent crime or at least encourage an immediate response if an 
emergency should arise.  Generally, actions by police officers are not carried out by 
everyday citizens: they do not respond to emergencies, nor are they tasked with 
maintaining the public order.  However, if the scope of immunity is limited to the 
officer’s operation of the vehicle—an action that is carried out by people 
generally—discretionary immunity may not apply. 
In Fortier, Lewiston’s AFJROTC program seemed to be the type of 
governmental program that would qualify for discretionary function immunity.  
The court could have found that the entire AFJROTC program served 
governmental policies on the federal, state, and local level.  As Lewiston argued at 
trial, “it is hard to fathom a program, policy, or objective that is inherently more 
governmental.”73  If the Law Court had been unwilling to make a broad statement 
about these sorts of programs, it could have found that Meyer was acting in 
furtherance of Lewiston’s specific governmental policy of maintaining the 
AFJROTC program at Lewiston High School.  In other words, Meyer’s decision to 
employ Twin Cities was a discretionary function.  Similarly, it is possible that 
Meyer’s decision to continue or discontinue the flights, which was part of the 
AFJROTC curriculum, could also qualify as a discretionary function.  Decisions 
regarding the administration of the AFJROTC program are not made by people 
generally. 
The trial court limited the scope of Meyer’s actions to an “operational 
decision[] made by a school employee regarding the safety of children.”74  Rather 
than interpreting the “use” provision of the MTCA, the Law Court could have 
found that the trial court’s interpretative scope for discretionary function was too 
narrow.  The court could have expanded the scope and concluded that Lewiston 
was entitled to immunity because Meyer was acting in his official capacity as the 
AFJROTC administrator. 
B.  Negligence 
In order to be liable under the MTCA, an exception to immunity under Section 
8104-A must apply without any other provision allowing for immunity, such as 
                                                                                                     
 72. Jorgensen v. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ME 42, ¶ 16, 969 A.2d 912, 917 (quoting Tolliver v. Dep’t 
of Transp., 2008 ME 83, ¶ 21, 948 A.2d 1223, 1231) (quotation marks omitted).  The origin of this 
phrase can be traced back to Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238, 241 (Me. 1996), which itself 
is quoting from W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 
1984). 
 73. Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, ANDSC-CV-2008-084 at 11 (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., 
July 22, 2009) (Delahanty, J.). 
 74. Id. at 12-13. 
2011] ESTATE OF FORTIER V. CITY OF LEWISTON 561 
Section 8104-B’s immunity for discretionary functions.  However, to reach either 
of these questions, there first must be a negligent act or omission.75  Typically, the 
MTCA is addressed at the summary judgment phase on immunity grounds, as it 
was in this case, because a lawsuit utterly fails if immunity is preserved.  Even 
though certain facts were assumed in this case,76 there is nothing that would have 
prevented either court from finding that Meyer was not negligent as a matter of 
law.77   
The victims’ families contended that Meyer was negligent based on his first-
hand knowledge of Weir’s “unusual” landing and his second-hand knowledge, 
through Taylor, of Weir’s maneuvers during the first flight.78  First, Weir’s landing 
in and of itself may not have been indicative of how he handled the plane in the air.  
Although Meyer described it as “unusual,” there is no indication that Meyer 
believed or had reason to believe that the landing was dangerous per se.   
Second, even if Meyer had learned the details of the first flight prior to take-off 
of the second flight, it is uncertain what alternative course of action he should have 
taken.  Meyer himself testified that there was nothing unsafe per se regarding any 
of Weir’s previous alleged maneuvers.79  The families argued that Weir had plainly 
violated certain FAA regulations, such as one prohibiting aerobatic maneuvers 
below an altitude of 1,500 feet.80  Based on Taylor’s statements, Meyer may not 
have had enough information to conclude anything with respect to Weir’s piloting.  
If Meyer had no rational reason to believe that Weir was a threat to the safety of the 
passengers, then Meyer could not have breached his duty of care for the students’ 
well-being by allowing them to board the plane. 
Third, it does not appear from the record that Meyer, as a career Air Force 
pilot, was hired as the Senior Aerospace Instructor because of his knowledge of 
FAA regulations and pilot safety.  Meyer’s vast experience certainly made him a 
valuable resource as an instructor and an ideal candidate to teach the cadets about 
the Air Force, but his ability to pilot an aircraft and his monitoring of Twin Cities’ 
pilots during the training flights may not have been part of his job.  Prior to 
Meyer’s arrival, Master Sergeant Thomas Noury served as the AFJROTC liaison 
and coordinated similar training flights, despite Noury’s inexperience as a pilot.81  
If Noury had been in charge in June 2006, he may not have been able to adequately 
critique Weir’s flying.  The court could have found that Meyer was not negligent 
because he did not have a heightened duty as the school’s instructor to assess the 
piloting skills of Twin Cities’ employee.82 
                                                                                                     
 75. See § 8104-A(1). 
 76. See Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 84, 85. 
 77. In fact, some courts do analyze the negligence component as part of their standard TCA 
analysis.  See infra Part V. 
 78. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 33, at 9, 12. 
 79. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 37, at 7. 
 80. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 33, at 9 n.3 (citation to footnote only). 
 81. Id. at 5 n.2 (citation to footnote only) (stating that Noury was never a licensed pilot and was not 
in the position to evaluate other pilots). 
 82. In Maine, “[o]nly when there is a ‘special relationship,’ may the actor be found to have a 
common law duty to prevent harm to another, caused by a third party.”  Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, 
2010 ME 75, ¶ 9, 2 A.3d 276, 279 (quoting Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 
1999 ME 144, ¶ 14, 738 A.2d 839, 845).  In Fortier, Meyer mostly likely did have a general duty as a 
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Fourth, governmental entities are not liable for the negligence of its 
independent contractors.  Certainly, Lewiston is not liable for the negligent acts of 
Twin Cities or its employees.  Fortier attempted to assert that the negligence of 
Meyer, not that of Weir or Twin Cities, resulted in the death of the students.  In 
fact, Weir was an FAA-certified flight instructor who should have been the most 
knowledgeable person regarding the operation and safety of the training aircraft.  
Despite Meyer’s landing observation and conversation with the students, the court 
could have found that it was simply not foreseeable that the plane would crash into 
the mountain.  The National Transportation Safety Board identified the probable 
cause of the accident as “[t]he flight instructor’s failure to maintain 
altitude/clearance while maneuvering, which resulted in an impact with the trees.”83  
This type of pilot error would likely carry a presumption of negligence.84  If Weir 
was negligent, it would have been a superseding act of negligence that caused the 
crash, and Meyer would be absolved of liability, even if Meyer were negligent.85 
C.  Insurance 
Title 14, Section 8116 of the Maine Revised Statutes provides an interesting 
relief valve to the broad immunity granted by the MTCA: “If . . . insurance 
provides coverage in areas where the governmental entity is immune, the 
governmental entity shall be liable in those substantive areas but only to the limits 
of the insurance coverage.”  On the one hand, this provision would seem to greatly 
expand the number of exceptions to the MTCA’s immunity so long as the entity 
had a relevant insurance policy.  This would allow for compensation to injured 
parties who otherwise may not have received anything for their injuries.  On the 
other hand, because having insurance would effectively increase liability, Section 
8116 would also serve as a disincentive for governmental entities to protect 
themselves against situations that are otherwise immune under the MTCA.  
Lewiston in particular is covered by the Maine Municipal Association Property & 
Casualty Pool, which specifically limits its coverage only to cases where immunity 
has been waived.86  In fact, most of the towns and cities in Maine are part of this 
insurance pool.87  Although Section 8116 certainly provides that a town may 
purchase additional insurance to cover accidents where it is immune, there is 
absolutely no reason for the town to do so. 
As it stands today, Section 8116 is functionally useless.  In this case, the 
                                                                                                     
school instructor to protect the students in his care.  However, that duty may not have extended beyond 
the reasonable care of a school instructor in a similar situation. 
 83. NTSB REPORT, supra note 34. 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965) (“The unexcused violation of a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.”). 
 85. Generally, if a third party’s negligence (Weir’s) is an overriding cause of the harm, then a prior 
negligent actor (Meyer) is not liable.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). 
 86. Telephone Interview with Edward R. Benjamin, Partner, Thompson & Bowie (Dec. 2, 2010) 
[hereinafter Benjamin Interview].  See also, e.g., Old Town v. Dimoulas, 2002 ME 133, ¶ 25 803 A.2d 
1018, 1025 (stating that a disclaimer limiting coverage to instances where sovereign immunity is 
explicitly waived is “sufficient to avoid a waiver of immunity pursuant to section 8116”) (citation 
omitted). 
 87. Benjamin Interview, supra note 86. 
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families were able to recover some damages through a settlement with Twin 
Cities,88 but in other cases, immunity may completely bar recovery.  If one of the 
purposes of the MTCA was to lessen the harshness of sovereign immunity, 
certainly one of the goals was to allow for increased recovery by injured parties.  
Although expanding the roads to recovery may lead to increased litigation, the 
Legislature should provide a better incentive for governmental entities to purchase 
supplemental insurance, particularly in a case like this where students were killed 
as part of a school function. 
V.  VIEWING FORTIER THROUGH OTHER STATES 
All states have some mechanism to deal with tort claims against them.  This 
section will analyze how several different states may have handled Fortier. The 
four states below were chosen to reflect a variety of approaches to sovereign 
immunity.  The selected states are not necessarily representative of all possible 
approaches, but they do serve to provide some perspective on Maine’s approach. 
A.  Alabama 
In Alabama, the State is absolutely immune from suit.89  This immunity only 
extends to “immediate and strict governmental agencies of the State”—county and 
city school boards historically did not fall into this area.90  Furthermore, because 
the school boards were given the right to sue, there was also “the implied right [for 
the school boards] to be sued.”91  Recently, however, the Alabama Supreme Court 
held that school boards are “local agencies of the State,” as opposed to county 
agencies, and are thus immune from suit.92 
In contrast, Maine public schools are primarily controlled at the local level, 
and school districts are largely able to develop their own curriculum and policies, 
so long as they meet the state statutory requirements.93  For example, many smaller 
towns band together to form “regional school units,” whereas some larger cities 
like Lewiston are solely responsible for the administration of their schools.94  
Because of the uniquely local character of Maine schools, it is unlikely that 
Lewiston High School would qualify as a “state agency” under Alabama’s narrow 
definition of state agencies.  Accordingly, if Alabama’s absolute immunity were 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. 
 89. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 90. Ex parte Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cnty., 161 So. 108, 109 (Ala. 1935). 
 91. Kimmons v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 85 So. 774, 777 (Ala. 1920).  This right to be sued 
was primarily founded in breaches of contract.  See, e.g., Sims v. Etowah Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 337 So. 2d 
1310, 1313 (Ala. 1976), overruled by Ex parte Hale Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d 844, 848 (Ala. 2009) 
(“[O]ur cases recognize that a county board of education may be sued on its contracts”). 
 92. Ex parte Hale Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d at 848 (emphasis omitted).  See also ALA. ADMIN. 
CODE r. 290-010-010.03 (2010) (“The general supervision of the public schools in Alabama is vested in 
the [Alabama State] Board [of Education]”). 
 93. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 20-A, § 2(2) (2008) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that the 
control and management of the public schools shall be vested in the legislative and governing bodies of 
local school administrative units”). 
 94. See ME. DEP’T OF EDUC., Maine School Administrative Units, MAINE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://www.maine.gov/education/eddir/saumap11x17.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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the law in Maine, it is likely that Lewiston could be sued in Fortier. 
B.  Delaware 
In Delaware, the State enjoys immunity under an “exception-to-immunity” 
style TCA similar to that of Maine.95  Delaware’s relevant exception destroys 
immunity for “[a] governmental entity[’s] . . . negligent acts or omissions causing . 
. . death . . . [i]n its ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle . . . .”96  
The “use” exception has been interpreted several times by the Delaware Supreme 
Court; however, “use” has not been defined per se.97  Instead, the analysis in these 
cases often turn on the level of negligence—the State is only liable for an 
employee’s ordinary negligence, and the employee is liable for gross negligence.98  
Notably, the Delaware cases seem to require a direct link between the State 
employee and the use of the vehicle or equipment; e.g., a police officer operating a 
police car.99 
If the Delaware analysis were applied in Maine, the Law Court would first 
begin by determining the character of Meyer’s negligence, if any.  If Meyer’s act of 
allowing the second group of students to board the plane were grossly negligent, he 
                                                                                                     
 95. Title 10, Section 4011(a) of the Delaware Code provides: “Except as otherwise expressly 
provided by statute, all governmental entities and their employees shall be immune from suit on any and 
all tort claims seeking recovery of damages.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 4011(a) (2011).  See also Fiat 
Motors v. Mayor of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 1062, 1067 n.8 (Del. 1985) (citing 62 Del. Laws, c. 124 § 2 
(House Bill #523)) (“Delaware’s act was . . . closely modeled after legislation enacted in the State of 
Maine”). 
 96. § 4012(1). 
 97. Compare Walls v. Rees, 569 A.2d 1161, 1167 (Del. 1990) (holding that seizure and storage of a 
vehicle did not qualify as “use”), with Sussex Cnty. v. Morris, 610 A.2d 1354, 1357-58, 1360 (Del. 
1991) (holding that the improper selection of equipment by a police officer to transfer a mentally ill 
passenger qualified as “use”). 
 98. See City of Wilmington v. Sikander, No. 449, 2006 Del. LEXIS 136, at *4 (Del. Sup. Ct. Mar. 
17, 2006) (indicating that a governmental entity is liable for its employee’s negligence, but the 
employee himself would be liable for “wanton negligence”).  This distinction would not apply in Maine 
as the court does not recognize the difference between simple and gross negligence.  See Reliance Nat’l 
Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs. Corp., 2005 ME 29, ¶ 17 868 A.2d 220, 227 (citing Cratty v. Samuel 
Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 131, 116 A.2d 623, 627 (1955)). 
 99. See, e.g., Jones v. Crawford, 1 A.3d 299, 301 (Del. 2010) (finding that a police officer who 
engaged in a high-speed chase that resulted in the death of a third party implicated the “use” exception).  
In Jones, the person being pursued by the officer directly caused the injury.  See id. at 301.  The court 
held that the officer was “using” the police car during the chase and remanded for the lower court to 
assess how the officer’s negligence may have related to the crash.  See id. at 302, 304.  In Maine, the 
court may have reached a different result given facts similar to those in Jones.  In Selby v. Cumberland 
County, 2002 ME 80, 796 A.2d 678, a high speed chase by a police officer resulted in an injury when 
the chased party crashed into a third party.  Id. ¶ 2, 796 A.2d at 679.  The decision by the officer in 
Selby to initiate the pursuit was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception of the 
MTCA.  See id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 796 A.2d at 680-82.  See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104-B(3) 
(2010).  It is unclear how this would be analyzed by the current court given the recent amendment to 
Section 8104-B(3).  See P.L. 2005, ch. 448, §1 (codified at § 8104-B(3)).  Rather than automatically 
dismissing the suit on immunity grounds, the court would likely have to conduct a fact-specific inquiry 
as to whether the particular high-speed chase was negligent under the circumstances.  Although 
Delaware has a similar discretion exception, it was not discussed in Jones.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 4011(b)(3).  Instead, Jones focused on liability created by an emergency vehicles statute.  See Jones, 1 
A.3d at 302 (citing § 4106). 
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would be solely liable; if the act were merely ordinary negligence, Lewiston would 
be liable.100  Liability of either type, of course, would be contingent on “use” as it 
relates to the aircraft.  Because the cases imply direct “use,” it seems unlikely that 
Meyer’s indirect use of the plane would fall under Delaware’s “use” exception, and 
Lewiston would maintain immunity. 
C.  South Carolina 
South Carolina employs an “exception-to-liability” approach, whereby 
immunity is broadly waived with limited exceptions restoring immunity.101  There 
is no exception for negligence arising from the use of motor vehicles, which is 
consistent with the Maine and Delaware approach.  There is an exception, however: 
the State is not liable for negligent supervision or custody of students, unless 
grossly negligent.102  This exception does not extend to negligent operation of a 
vehicle containing students.103  Additionally, South Carolina’s TCA is generally 
construed, when possible, to limit the liability of the State.104 
If Maine adopted South Carolina’s approach, Meyer’s role as school instructor 
would seem to place his acts within the exception restoring immunity—his decision 
to allow the students to board the plane is connected to his supervision or custody 
of the students.  The key question would ask if Meyer was grossly negligent in this 
duty.  If Meyer had learned about Weir’s unusual flying before the second group of 
students boarded the plane, and if Meyer reasonably concluded based on his 
experience as a pilot that the students were not in danger, then it seems unlikely 
that his negligence, (if any), would rise above ordinary negligence.  Additionally, 
because neither Lewiston nor Meyer were “operating” the aircraft, the exception to 
liability would likely be maintained.  Applying South Carolina law, Lewiston 
would probably be immune from suit. 
D.  Texas 
Texas, like South Carolina, employs an “exception-to-liability” approach in its 
TCA.105 Specifically, the government is liable for “negligence of an employee 
acting within his scope of employment if . . . personal injury[] or death arises from 
the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.”106  Even though the Legislature did 
not define “operation” or “use,” the Texas Supreme Court construed the terms 
using their plain meanings: “Operation refers to a doing or performing of a 
                                                                                                     
 100. Analyzing whether there was negligence first, as in this instance, may avoid the need to reach 
the TCA altogether.  See Part IV.B. 
 101. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (2009) (generally conferring liability on the state for its torts) 
and § 15-78-60 (listing forty exceptions that restore immunity). 
 102. Id. § 15-78-60(25) (restoring immunity when a loss arises from the “responsibility or duty 
including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, 
patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is 
exercised in a grossly negligent manner”). 
 103. Gardner v. Biggart, 417 S.E.2d 858, 860 (S.C. 1992). 
 104. § 15-78-20(f). 
 105. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.025(a) (2009) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is 
waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter”). 
 106. Id. § 101.021. 
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practical work,”107 and “use means to put or bring into action or service; to employ 
for or apply to a given purpose.”108  One important exception to the State’s liability 
restores immunity to school districts, unless a motor vehicle is involved.109  
However, the governmental employee herself must be negligently operating or 
using the motor vehicle to confer liability.110  Generally, sovereign immunity is 
preferred when interpreting the statute.111  Thus, because a school employee was 
not driving the vehicle, a school district was immune from suit when a student was 
injured while riding in a pickup truck on school grounds.112 
Because Texas’ law utilizes a broad meaning for “use,” if the Law Court 
applied it to Fortier, Lewiston’s indirect “use” of the chartered flight may have 
been sufficient to confer liability.  However, because Meyer was not directly 
operating the plane and was not technically using the plane himself, Lewiston may 
fall under the school exception to immunity.  Given the preference of immunity 
over liability, Lewiston most likely could not be sued under Texas law. 
VI.  FURTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE MTCA 
Adding to the complexity of MTCA case law, several months after Fortier, the 
Law Court again addressed an issue arising under the MTCA in Searle v. 
Bucksport.113  The case dealt with an injury resulting from a fall on Bucksport High 
School’s football bleachers and required the court to analyze the MTCA’s “public 
building exception.”114  In another 4-3 decision, the majority utilized the principles 
of statutory construction to determine whether the bleachers were an 
“appurtenance” to the high school.115  Similar to Fortier, the court began with the 
aim of narrowly interpreting the MTCA exception before looking to the meaning of 
“appurtenance” to see if the bleachers qualified.116 
This time, the majority was able to build on early case law that had narrowed 
Maine’s interpretation of “appurtenance” to the more restrictive term “fixture.”117  
An “appurtenance” is something “that belongs or is attached to a public 
building”118 whereas a “fixture” is “an irremovable part of the real property with 
                                                                                                     
 107. Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989) 
(citing Jackson v. City of Corpus Christi, 484 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108. Id. (citing Beggs v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 109. § 101.051. 
 110. LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannet Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Tarkington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aiken, 67 S.W.3d 319, 321, 326 (Tex. App. 2002). 
 113. 2010 ME 89, 3 A.3d 390 (4-3 decision). 
 114. Id. ¶ 1, 3 A.3d at 393.  “A governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in the 
construction, operation or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances to any public 
building.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104-A(2) (2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 115. Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 11-14, 3 A.3d at 394-95. 
 116. See id. ¶¶ 9-11, 3 A.3d at 394-95.  
 117. Id. ¶ 14, 3 A.3d at 395 (citing Sanford v. Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶¶ 9-12, 850 A.2d 325, 328-
29).  
 118. Id. ¶ 11, 3 A.3d at 394 (citing Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d at 329). 
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which [it is] associated.”119  In this case, because the bleachers were movable, 
(albeit with significant effort), and not physically attached to the ground, the 
majority found that the bleachers were not an appurtenance.120 
Once again, the majority distorted the plain meaning of the statutory language 
within the MTCA in order to narrowly construe exceptions to immunity.  As the 
dissent points out, this narrow definition could set up a situation where one set of 
bleachers physically attached to the ground would expose the school to liability 
under the MTCA whereas immunity would be maintained for an adjacent set of 
unattached bleachers.121  If true, this situation would seem to constitute an absurd 
result that the court strives to avoid when interpreting statutes.122 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court reached a reasonable decision in Fortier.  The court’s holding 
furthers the doctrine that the State is generally immune from suit, save for a few, 
narrow exceptions.  Additionally, the outcome of the case is consistent with how 
several other states would have likely held, as discussed in Part V.  However, 
functionally, the decisions in both Fortier and Searle serve as signals to the 
Legislature to revise and clarify the language of the MTCA.123  Since 2003, the 
Law Court has rendered more than 1,200 opinions, approximately 88% of which 
were unanimous with only 2.6% resulting in 4-3 decisions.124 
In contrast, out of the fifteen cases interpreting exceptions to MTCA immunity 
during the same time period, four, or more than 25%, have been 4-3 decisions.125  
Simply stated, the MTCA has generated more closely divided opinions than would 
be expected.  The reason lies within the MTCA itself.  Although the court is 
deferring to the Legislature so as to not expand the scope of sovereign immunity, 
the court’s highly contested decisions demonstrate that the Legislature has failed to 
draft reasonable, interpretable language in several of the exceptions to immunity in 
the MTCA.  The court’s jurisprudence suggests that the MTCA is full of 
unworkable, ambiguous language.  More precisely, when statutory language can 
reasonably be interpreted in multiple ways, with each interpretation yielding a 
reasonable result, the language itself is unworkable.  Furthermore, if the Legislature 
did not mean to utilize the plain meaning of the words in the statute but instead 
intended a more nuanced interpretation, then the Legislature should revise the 
MTCA.  If, as in Fortier, “use” means the more restrictive term “operation,” or if 
                                                                                                     
 119. Id. ¶ 16, 3 A.3d at 396 (citing Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d at 329). 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 3 A.3d at 397-98. 
 121. Id. ¶ 28, 3 A.3d at 399 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. ¶ 8, 3 A.3d at 394 (majority opinion) (citing Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, 
¶ 12, 967 A.2d 690, 695). 
 123. Previously, Chief Justice Saufley urged the Legislature to clarify its intentions with respect to 
governmental immunity in emergency situations, and it took her advice.  See Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 
118, ¶ 24, 834 A.2d 928, 935. 
 124. ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, Most Recent Opinions, MAINE.GOV, http://www.courts.state.me.us/ 
court_info/opinions/supreme/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2010). 
 125. The exceptions to immunity are mentioned in the text accompanying note 28 supra.  The four 4-
3 decisions since 2003 include Norton, Fortier, and Searle.  Donovan v. Portland, 2004 ME 70, 950 
A.2d 319, another 4-3 decision, dealt with the public building exception under Section 8104-A(2). 
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as in Searle “appurtenance” means the more restrictive term “fixture,” then the 
Legislature should alter the language of the statute to accurately reflect its 
intentions.  In fact, the Legislature should carefully review the MTCA in its 
entirety to avoid any 4-3 decisions from the court in the future. 
 
 
